ADVERTISEMENT
It’s a strong signal that speaks volumes about Europe’s ambitions in the Arctic region. Last week, the European Commission proposed doubling its financial aid to Greenland as part of the next EU budget.
Under the multi-annual financial framework for 2028–2034, the Commission is proposing over €530 million in funding for Nuuk.
But Greenland is just one part of the picture. The entire Arctic region has become a focal point of global commercial and geopolitical interests. The melting ice caused by global warming is reshuffling the political landscape.
A new maritime route
As climate change is making it easier to navigate the Northern Sea Route, goods can be transported without the use of icebreakers. This passage could significantly shorten the shipping distance between Europe and Asia. In 2023, the route saw a record of 35 million tonnes transported.
“The trade route through the north is much more convenient between Beijing and Rotterdam than the traditional route through the Strait of Malacca, the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden, which is of course 30 to 50% longer and takes 14 to 20 days longer than the Arctic route,” Yan Cavalluzzi, security and defence analyst for NCT Consultants, explained to Euronews.
However, some analysts see the growth created by this northern maritime route as moderate in comparison with the Suez Canal, which saw 1.6 billion tonnes pass through it over the same period.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that China considers itself to be a country close to the Arctic. In fact, Beijing launched its “Polar Silk Road” strategy in 2018.
For the European Union, cooperation with China in the Arctic is strategically important, despite ongoing geopolitical tensions. In 2024, China was the EU’s largest import partner, accounting for 21.3% of all imports.
But this route is not as open as it seems. 53% of this northern maritime route runs alongside Russia, and the Kremlin is seeking to extend its exclusive economic zone, challenging international maritime law.
A geostrategic waterway
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the militarisation of the Arctic has intensified. The region was already home to Russia’s Northern Fleet. But NATO has now moved a step closer to Russia with the accession of Finland and Sweden.
“In fact, one of the reasons why the United States wanted Finland and Sweden to join NATO was that it had scaled back its own Arctic capabilities after the end of the Cold War and were no longer investing in warfare there,” Yan Cavalluzzi said.
“Their NATO membership therefore guarantees them [the United States] quicker and easier access to Arctic warfare technologies and capabilities,” he continued.
In order to defend its interests, the Union therefore cannot rely solely on its Member States present in the region.
“Think of submarine infrastructures, such as fibre-optic cables. It is easy to see why it is so important to have a presence in the region,” Ivan Zaccagnini, researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy at the VUB (Free Flemish University of Brussels) noted.
Zaccagnini suggested the EU should consider “Greenland or other territories in the region as platforms for setting up what is known as an early warning system, or even deploying air, naval or even robotic units directly to the Arctic.”
The EU adopted an Arctic strategy in 2021, but since the start of the war, it seems to have changed its stance, according to Ivan Zaccagnini,
“Overall, the EU is moving from a rather passive observer role to a more active and committed position, as well as a geopolitical position in the region.”
Reflecting European weaknesses
The Arctic’s vast hydrocarbon reserves have become a strategic focus for the world’s major powers. According to estimates, the region holds 13% of undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of gas reserves. For the EU, access to these resources would enable the bloc to diversify its supplies and strengthen its strategic autonomy.
However, the EU faces significant challenges in asserting its influence in the Arctic. The bloc is faced with Russia’s growing influence, supported by China. In addition, the EU’s military dependence on the United States limits the scope of its actions in the northern region.
Complicating matters further is the expansionism of US President Donald Trump, who seeks to strengthen his position in the region. Trump has openly expressed, on several occasions, a desire to annex Greenland.
To move beyond a purely diplomatic role, Zaccagnini suggests that the EU should “continue to invest in platforms and capabilities in order to have a presence in the region, for example in terms of patrols, by deploying patrol units in the region to ensure security and to intervene in the event of any disruption to underwater infrastructures.”
Still, the road ahead is long. For now, the EU may need to rely on its strengths in diplomacy and negotiation to assert its voice and interests in the region.
